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Hardening the ElGamal Cryptosystem in the Setting of the Second 
Group of Units 
Suzan Mohamad Fanous 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to give up to date discussion of the principles, techniques 
and algorithms of interest in cryptographic practice. We choose to emphasize on the 
most practical and applied cryptographic system, El-Gamal scheme. 
This thesis discusses modifications we made on El-Gamal scheme, mainly extending 
the scheme to work on the second group of units of Zn and the second group of units 
of the quotient ring of polynomials over a field with cyclic second group of units. 
The arithmetic needed in this new setting is described. Algorithms are given. 
Advantages and efficiency of the new method are pointed out. Finally the security of 
the new scheme is studied and suggestions for further work are introduced. 
 
Keywords: Second group of units of    , Second group of units of             , 
generator, ElGamal Cryptosystem, Baby Step Giant Step attack algorithm, Private 
key. 
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Problem Statement: 
ElGamal Public Key Cryptosystem is one of the most practical cryptosystems 
nowadays. This cryptosystem works in the setting of any cyclic group G. This group 
G should be carefully chosen. Hence, when choosing G two conditions should be 
satisfied: 
1. The operations in G are easy to perform. 
2. The Discrete Logarithm problem in G should be infeasible. 
ElGamal cryptosystem was extended in the setting of the following cyclic groups: 
1. The domain of Gaussian integers. 
2. Over the group of units of         
   
3. The group of units of              where h(x) is an irreducible 
polynomial. 
4. The group of units of                          where       are 
irreducible polynomials of pair-wise relatively prime degrees. 
As known, the more secure and efficient the cryptosystem is the more practical and 
useful it becomes. So, there is always a need to enhance ElGamal and end up with a 
more secure and efficient cryptosystem. 
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1.2 Scope of the thesis:  
In this work, we extend the ElGamal cryptosystem to work in the setting of a new 
group G; the second group of units. We ended up with three modified cases: 
1. The second group of units of Zn when the first group of units is also cyclic. 
2. The second group of units of Zn when the first group of units is not cyclic. 
3. The second group of units of Z2[x]/<h(x)> where h(x) is an irreducible 
polynomial. 
A study of the values of n for which the second group of units is cyclic was 
performed. We ended up with six cases; in three of them both the second group and 
the first group of units were cyclic whereas in the other three cases only the second 
group of units was cyclic. 
Then, the algorithms for constructing the second group of units in each case were 
provided. Next, the modified ElGamal cryptosystem in each case was introduced and 
a study of its efficiency and security was pointed out to. 
 
1.3 The organization of the thesis: 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter one is an introductory chapter. Chapter 
two contains some basic cryptographic concepts. In chapter three a useful math 
background was provided. Chapter 4, describes some previous work that was 
performed on the ElGamal cryptosystem. Chapters 5 and 6 provide a description of 
the proposed cryptosystem. Chapter 7, contains the experimental results of testing the 
efficiency and security of the extended cryptosystems. Finally, Chapter 8 is a 
concluding chapter that concludes the thesis and recommends some future work. 
3 
  
Chapter Two  
Fundamentals of Cryptography 
 
2.1 Introduction:  
Cryptography is the way of transmitting sensitive data and information such that only 
those who it's intended for can read and process. So, the aim of using cryptography is 
to hide information. In fact, this goal can't be achieved when some algorithms are 
used to reveal this information.  
 
It should be noted that, the most striking development in the history of cryptography 
came in 1976 when Diffie and Hellman published New Directions in Cryptography 
[1]. 
 
Cryptanalysis is the way of deciphering the decrypted sensitive data. 
 
2.2 Cryptography Definitions [2] 
Encryption is the method of transforming a plaintext into a ciphertext.  
When the plaintext is transformed into ciphertext both human and machine won't be 
able to process it until it is decrypted. 
This allows the transmission of confidential information over insecure channels 
without unauthorized disclosure. As data is stored on a computer, it's protected by 
access controls. But when it's sent over a network, it would be in a much more 
vulnerable state. 
A system that provides encryption and decryption is referred to as a cryptosystem. 
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The cryptosystem uses an encryption algorithm. Encryption algorithms apply complex 
mathematical formulas on the plaintext. They use a secret value called a key to 
encrypt and decrypt a message. An illustration is shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 An Encryption Scheme  
 
Cryptography Definitions 
• Cryptanalysis is the method of getting plaintext from ciphertext without a key or 
without breaking the encryption. 
• Cryptology The science that studies both cryptography and cryptanalysis. 
• Ciphertext is the Data that is in encrypted or unreadable format. 
• Encipher is to transform data into an unreadable format 
• Decipher is to transform data into a readable format 
• Keyspace is the set of all possible values from where a key is constructed. 
• Work factor is the time and all the resources needed to decipher a message. 
 
2.3 Types of Ciphers 
Mainly, we have two types of ciphers: substitution and transposition. 
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1. The substitution cipher is based on replacing characters, or blocks of 
characters with different characters.  
2. The transposition cipher moves the text in a certain way. It rearranges bits, 
characters, or blocks of characters to hide the original message. Hence it uses 
permutation instead of replacement. 
 
2.3.1 Substitution Cipher 
A substitution cipher is referred to as shifting alphabet. So, each letter is shifted a 
certain number of places beyond it in the original alphabet. 
Example: in the Caesar Cipher, each letter is shifted to three places beyond it and is 
then replaced with the letter in that position.  
There exist other types of substitutions where shifting takes place with more than one 
alphabet. 
 
2.3.2 Transposition Cipher 
In a transposition cipher, letters are rearranged or scrambled they are not replaced 
with other letters from the alphabet. Also, a key is needed to determine to what 
positions are the letters moved. 
 
Figure 2.2, shows a simple example on transposition cipher, but when introduced with 
complex mathematical functions transposition becomes difficult to break. 
Nowadays, ciphers use both substitutions and permutations on the messages.  
 
Such ciphers are vulnerable to attacks like the frequency analysis. It's clear that some 
words in each language are used more than other words.  
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Since such words are used frequently in the language, this would help attackers guess 
the transformation between plaintext and the ciphertext and hence to find the key that 
was used in the transformation. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Transposition Cipher  
 
2.4 Public Key Cryptography 
Simply, this cryptosystem uses two types of keys, public and private, that are usually 
generated by an asymmetric algorithm that allows key distribution. Another key, the 
secrete key, is generated by a symmetric algorithm and is then used for the bulk 
encryption. 
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It should be noted that, in symmetric cryptography two users use the same key. On the 
other hand, asymmetric cryptography enables the two users to use different keys. But 
it should be noted that it is too slow compared to symmetric cryptography. 
 
So to have the best of both types, a hybrid approach is used in a complementary way. 
This would allow a high level of security in an acceptable amount of time. 
 
The hybrid approach works as follows: the symmetric algorithm is used at the first 
place to create the keys that would be used for encryption. Next, the asymmetric 
algorithm generates the keys used for key distribution. 
 
It should be noted that the secret key is used for encrypting the messages you want to 
send .But the receiver needs the secrete key too in order to decipher the message. 
Hence, this key should not travel unprotected or else an attacker would be able 
decrypt the message and find your information. 
 
So, this key should be encrypted too. To encrypt the secrete key an asymmetric 
algorithm is used. In fact, an asymmetric algorithm takes more time than the 
symmetric one due to math complexity. That's why we use it on the key and we 
usually use the fast symmetric algorithm on the message itself since its length is going 
to be longer than the length of the key.  
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Chapter Three 
Mathematical Background 
 
In this chapter, basic definitions from number theory, abstract algebra and finite 
fields are involved, to facilitate the understanding of the material.  
Definition 1: [3]  
Given n>0, the congruence relation     is defined for two integers a, b in Z by: 
                          if n| (a-b) 
Definition 2: [4] 
Two integers a, b are relatively prime if and only if GCD (a, b) = 1. 
Definition 3: Let d be the gcd (a, n) [5] 
     1.  If d=1, then              has a solution              
2. If d   , then              has a solution x if and only if d|b. 
Definition 4: Chinese Remainder Theorem [6] 
The system of congruencies: 
                
          
          
Has a unique solution            when            are pair-wise relatively 
prime. 
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Definition 5: [7] 
A ring (R, +,  ) is defined as the set R with two binary operations" + (addition) and   
(multiplication) on R", that satisfies the following axioms: 
1. (R, +)  is an Abelian group with identity "0". 
2. The operation     is associative. That's a               
                 . 
3. There is a multiplicative identity denoted by 1, with     such that     
       for all a    . 
4. The operation     is distributive over +. That's               
      and                     for all a, b, c    . 
Definition 6: 
The set of units in a ring R forms a group under multiplication called the group of 
units of R. 
Definition 7: Given the two elements a and b of the ring R: [8] 
"a" is called a unit if there exits b in R such that a   b = 1, where 1 is the 
multiplicative identity of R. 
Definition 8: [8] 
The group of units of Zn is the multiplicative group 
   
                     .  
If n is a prime, then:    
                . 
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Definition 9: 
The ring is a commutative ring if         for all a, b    . 
Definition 10: [9] 
The Euler Phi function      is the number of integers between 1 and n that are 
relatively prime with n. 
For     
    
     
   the Euler Phi function is: 
             
            
             
     
Definition 11: 
The order of an element     
  is the least positive integer t such that    
         . 
Theorem 1: 
If                                   for all integers a. In other words, when 
working modulo n, exponents can be reduced modulo     . 
Definition 12:   
If the order of an element     
  is     , then a is said to be a generator or a 
primitive element of    
 . If   
  has a generator then it is said to be cyclic. 
Properties of a generator of    
  : 
1.   
  has a generator "a" if and only if n = 2, 4,           where p is an odd 
prime and t   . 
2. For each element b in the group, b=    . 
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3. If a is a generator of    
 , then   
                          . 
4. If    
  is cyclic then it has         generators. 
 
Algorithm 1: (Finding a generator of    
 ) 
1. Select an integer a,        . 
2. Write            
    
     
   
3. For i=1 to k 
3.1 Compute  
   
        
3.2 If   
   
        is congruent to 1 mod p, then return to step 1. 
4. Return with a as a generator. 
 
Homomorphism and Isomorphism: 
A function f from a group G to group G1 is homomorphism if the following condition 
is satisfied: For all elements a, b in the group G: [10] 
 f (a.b) = f (a) f (b)  
A one to one onto homomorphism is called an isomorphism.  
Let f: G   G1 be an onto homomorphism from G to G1, then G1 is cyclic if G is 
cyclic. 
Also if G is isomorphic to G1,      and G1 is cyclic then so is G. 
Note that every finite cyclic group of order n is isomorphic to Zn and every infinite 
cyclic group is isomorphic to Z. 
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Theorem 2: 
Let G1, G2, G3, .., Gr be groups and let            be their external product 
i.e., the group defined on the Cartesian product whose operation is defined point-wise. 
Then,             is cyclic if and only if |Gi| and |Gj| are relatively prime when 
i   j. 
Lemma 1: 
Let m and n be two positive integers, then           if and only if gcd(m, n) = 
1. Also if n = n1.n2…nr then                  if and only if n1, n2,.., nr are 
pair-wise relatively prime numbers. 
Theorem 3: (Fundamental Theorem of Finite Abelian Groups) 
Every finite Abelian group is a direct product of cyclic groups of prime power order 
Theorem 4: 
The group of units of Zn is given by: 
1.           
2.          
3.                  when a    . 
4.                   
Definition 13: 
An irreducible polynomial is a polynomial that can't be written as a product of two 
polynomials with positive degrees. 
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Definition 14: 
Given R is a commutative ring; a polynomial over R has the form: 
        
       
                           . 
    is called the coefficient of  
  in f(x). 
Degree of f(x) is the highest power of x in f(x). 
Polynomial ring R[x]: is the commutative ring formed by the set of all polynomials 
having coefficients from R.  
The operations used in R[x] are the standard polynomial addition and multiplication. 
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Chapter Four 
Literature Review 
 
4.1 The Classical ElGamal Public Key Encryption Scheme:  
It is the most popular and widely used cryptosystem. It is described in the setting of 
the multiplicative group   
 . For more details see [11] and [12]. 
The multiplicative group of   
  = {1, 2, .., p-1 } is a cyclic group generated by a 
generator from the group. 
The following algorithms show how the ElGamal cryptosystem functions: 
Algorithm 2: (Key Generation) 
A should do the following: 
1. Generate a large random prime p and find the generator   of    
 . 
2. Select a random integer a, 1        and compute         . 
3. A's public Key is (p,  ,   ) and A's private Key is a. 
Algorithm 3: (Encryption) 
B should do the following: 
1. Obtain A's authentic public key (p,  ,   ). 
2. Represent the message as an integer m in the range {0, 1, 2,…, p-1}. 
3. Select a random integer k, where 2       . 
4. Compute                                   
5. Send the ciphertext c =       to A. 
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Algorithm 4: (Decryption) 
A should do the following: 
1. Use the private Key a to compute            . 
2. Recover the message m by computing                
 
4.2 ElGamal Public Key Encryption Scheme over Finite Fields: 
4.2.1 Introduction: 
In [13], Smith and Gallian determined the structure of the group of units of the 
quotient ring             , where f (x) is a polynomial in      . Then, according 
to this structure El-Kassar et al. [14] gave a characterization of quotient ring of 
polynomials over finite fields with cyclic group of units. 
In [15], El-Gamal cryptosystem was extended in the setting of          
  . 
Later on in [16], El-Gamal cryptosystem was extended to the setting of quotient ring 
of polynomials having a cyclic group of units U (            ) where p is an odd 
prime. In [17], this modification was tested and evaluated according to reliability, 
efficiency and security. 
Two cases for h(x) were studied [14]: 
Case 1: h (x) =    (hence h(x) is reducible polynomial of degree n=2) 
Case 2: h(x) =                  (h(x) is a product of irreducible polynomials 
      of degrees   ) 
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The elements of U (            ) can be described as follows:  
U (            ) = {              
                      }. 
4.2.2 Case 1: h(x) =     
The order of U (       
   is              and its elements can be described as: 
         
    c+ d x |1  c                   
The extended El-Gamal cryptosystem in this setting is given in the following three 
algorithms. 
To generate the public and private keys, entity should use algorithm 5: 
Algorithm 5: (Key Generation) 
1. Generate a large random prime p and find      . 
2. Find the generator   (x) of U (       
  , that is write U (       
             
U (       
                     
          
3. Select a random integer a,              . 
4. Compute               
5. A's public key is (p,   ,           ); A's private key is a. 
In order to encrypt m(x)            
   , entity B should use algorithm 6. 
Algorithm 6: (Encryption algorithm) 
1. Get the public key. 
2. Select a random integer k,               . 
3. Represent the message as a polynomial m(x)            
   . 
4. Compute                                                . 
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5. Send the ciphertext (         ) to A. 
For decryption, B uses the following algorithm. 
Algorithm 7: (Decryption scheme) 
1. Uses the private key a to compute      
              
2. Recover the plaintext m(x) by computing      
                   
4.2.3 Case 2: h(x) =                  and p=2 
The powers     of each of the       are pair-wise relatively prime and the order of    
U (            ) is           
                     . 
For generating the keys, entity A should use algorithm 8: 
Algorithm 8: (Key Generation) 
1. Choose pair-wise relatively prime numbers       ,..,   . 
2. Find irreducible polynomials                     over    of degrees    . 
3. Form h(x)=                  
4. Find                                . 
5. Find the generator   (x) of U (             . 
6. Select a random integer a,                . 
7. Compute                 
8. A's public key is (h(x),            ); A's private key is a. 
In order to encrypt m(x)                 , entity B should use algorithm 9. 
Algorithm 9: (Encryption Scheme) 
18 
  
1. Obtain A's public key. 
2. Select a random integer k,                . 
3. Represent the message as a polynomial m(x)                 . 
4. Compute                                                 . 
5. Send the ciphertext (         ) to A. 
For decryption, entity B uses the following algorithm. 
Algorithm 10: (Decryption scheme) 
1. Uses the private key a to compute                         
2. Recover the plaintext m(x) by computing                       
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Chapter Five 
El-Gamal Cryptosystem over the second group of units 
 
5.1 The Second Group of Units of      
Theorem 5: (Fundamental Theorem of Abelian Groups) Every finite 
Abelian group is a direct product of cyclic groups of prime power order. 
Let R be a finite commutative ring with identity. By the fundamental theorem 
of finite Abelian groups, the group of units, U (R), is isomorphic to the direct 
product of cyclic groups, say                    . Hence, the 
multiplicative group U (R) supports a ring structure by defining the 
operations       on U (R) that make (       ) a ring isomorphic to 
              . The ring               will be denoted by  
 . 
Definition 15: In [18], the second group of units of     is defined as the 
group of units of the ring      :  
                   
  . 
The paper considered the problem of determining the values of n that make 
       cyclic. The result was as follows: 
Theorem 6: Let p and q be odd prime integers and   be a positive integer. Then, 
       is cyclic iff one of the following is true: 
1.            ,where             
2.   n = 15 ; 
3.   n=3.p, where p=4k+3 and 2k+1=    
21 
  
4.                           ; 
5.  n= 2 , 4, 8, or 16; 
6.  n= 5 or       , where      is a prime integer; 
7. n=  ; 
5.1.1 Classification: These results can be classified into two cases: 
Case 1: Both U (  ) and  
      are cyclic: 
As known U (  ) is cyclic when n = 2, 4,  
        where     and p is an 
odd prime integer. So out of the previous seven cases for n, only the 
following belong to case one: 
1.        since n is in the form of               
2.          
3. n = 5 or        since       is a prime integer, so it's in the form 
of              
4. n =   since n is in the form of              
Case 2:        is cyclic whereas, U (  ) is not cyclic: 
1.          , where             
2. n = 15; 
3. n = 3.p, where p=4k+3 and 2k+1=     
4.                     ; 
5. n = 4 or 16; 
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5.2 Construction of        in case 1 
5.2.1 Construction: to construct the second group of units       , we follow the 
following steps: 
1. Form the group of units U(  ), where U(  )={a                 }. The 
order of U(  ) is       
2. Find a generator r of U(  ). 
3. Write U(  ) in the form:   
               . 
4. Find         
        
                  
5. Write            
            
         
Example 1: n = 23, U (   ) = {1, 2, 3, …, 22} and         . The generator of     
U (   ) is r =5. 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
                                        
  
U(   ) 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
                                            
Table 5.1 Elements of    
 
          
                                                    
Then                                        The order of  
       is 
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5.2.2 Operations: In [4], the operations over the ring (U (  ), . ,  ) are  defined as 
follows: 
1. Addition operation:  x . y = xy mod n. 
2. Multiplication operation:                   where r is the generator of       
U (  ).  
3. The power operation: Let   be an element of        such that    
   r is the 
generator of U (  ), then  
      
 
. 
Identity: The identity of the second group of units of    is r [4], where r is the 
generator of U (  ). 
 
5.3 Construction of        in case 2 
Lemma 2: Let n and m be any two positive integers, then 
                        
Also, if                                   iff            are 
pairwise relatively prime. 
Lemma 3:  
1.          . 
2.         . 
3.                       . 
4.                   
Theorem 7: If                                   . 
23 
  
We will work on the case where n= 3p: 
                           
             
                                            . 
 
Definition 16: Isomorphism Functions: 
1. The isomorphism function f:                           is:  
for every a        ,  f(a) = (a (mod n), a (mod m)). 
2. The isomorphism function    :             is            where r is the 
generator of      . 
 
5.3.1 Construction of         
1. Construct      ,       and      . 
2. Find G = {(a (mod 3), a (mod p)): a       }. 
3. Find the generator r of       and   the generator of      . 
4. Write G in the form: 
              
                                      . 
5. Form the set              
    and find G1, the set of its invertible elements. 
Note that: (a, b) is invertible in         if a is invertible in    and b is invertible in 
    . 
6.        is the set of elements in       corresponding to elements in G1. 
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Example 2:  
Let p = 11,                            . 
                                                                
                              , 2 is a generator of       . 
           , 2 is a generator of        
       1 2 4 5 7 8 10 
             (1,1) (2,2) (1,4) (2,5) (1,7) (2,8) (1,10) 
(     ) (     ) (     ) (     ) (     ) (     ) (     ) (     ) 
       (0,0) (1,1) (0,2) (1,4) (0,7) (1,3) (0,5) 
 
       13 14 16 17 19 20 23 
             (1,2) (2,3) (1,5) (2,6) (1,8) (2,9) (2,1) 
(     ) (     ) (     ) (     ) (     ) (     ) (     ) (     ) 
       (0,1) (1,8) (0,4) (1,9) (0,3) (1,6) (1,0) 
 
       25 26 28 29 31 32 
             (1,3) (2,4) (1,6) (2,7) (1,9) (2,10) 
(     ) (     ) (     ) (     ) (     ) (     ) (     ) 
       (0,8) (1,2) (0,9) (1,7) (0,6) (1,5) 
Table 5.3 Table of isomorphism between    and        
Invertible elements in        are:  {(1, 1), (1, 3), (1, 9), (1, 7)}. Then: 
                   . 
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5.3.2 Operations: 
1. Multiplication: (        ) 
a    =                where f :                   
Suppose that: f (a) = (c, d) and f (b) = (e, g). 
                                   . 
Define:  : x  y =  
     , where r is the generator of      . 
                : x   y =  
      , where   is the generator of      . 
2. Power operation: f :                 . 
Let a                      
    
   , then          
 
   
  
 
 . 
Proof:                   
          
              
    
       
     
                                                                                                    
 
   
  
 
) 
For induction purpose, assume that the result is true for N-1: 
So,           
   
   
  
   
 then, 
                         
            
   
   
  
   
   
           
       
   
   
  
   
   
                                     
       
       
  
   
        
 
   
  
 
  
Identity: The identity of         is the element a   
         
         , where r 
is the generator of      and   is the generator of     . 
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5.4 ElGamal Cryptosystem over        for case 1: 
Finding a generator of       for case 1: 
Algorithm 11 (Generator of        )  
1. Find a generator    of         
2. Write the order of       as    
    
      
  . 
3. Select a random integer s,                      . 
4. For j = 1 to i, do: 
4.1 Compute   
 
   mod n. 
4.2 If     
 
 
  
 
 mod n     , then go to step 3. 
5. Return   
For key generation, entity A does the following: 
Algorithm 12(Key Generation)  
1. Find a generator     of       . 
2. Find s using Algorithm 1. 
3. Compute the order of        using              . 
4. Select a random integer a,              , compute               . 
5. A’s public key is (        )  and A’s private key is a.   
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B encrypts a message m for A using the algorithm below: 
Algorithm 13 (Encryption) 
1. B obtains A’s authentic public key (         ). 
2. Represent the message as an integer in       . 
3. Select a random integer k, where              . 
4. Compute                 ,              ,                  and                           
                 . 
5. Send the ciphertext c = (   ) to A.   
 
To recover the plaintext m from c, A should do the following: 
Algorithm 14 (Decryption) 
1. Use the private key "a" to compute            - a. 
2. Recover the message by computing                              . 
 
The following theorem proves that the decryption formula               allows the 
recovery of the message m. This proof is for case 1. 
Theorem 8: Given a generator    of        such that     
 , where     is the 
generator of      . Define    
          and                  . If   
       such that s   
            , then s = m. 
Proof:      
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                 . 
But, m and s belong to the same complete residue system modulo n and s  m (mod 
n)  m  =  s. 
Example 4: In this example, we will work on the case n =   .  
Let    ,   = 5 is a generator of U (   ) and      is a generator of  
      . A 
uses a = 3 and calculates            
 
              
                                                           . 
To encrypt m = 5, B selects an integer k = 4 and finds                     
   ,                      and                . B sends (     
   ) to A.  
Finally, A computes               and                 
             Then finds                           
 
5.5 ElGamal Cryptosystem over        for case 2: 
Finding a generator of         for case 2: 
Suppose that n = 3.p. Note that the generator of          2. 
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Algorithm 15(Generator of        )  
1. Find a generator    of         
2. Compute the order of        ,          
3. Write the order of       as    
    
      
  . 
4. Select a random integer s,                      . 
5. For j = 1 to i, do: 
4.1 Compute   
 
   mod p. 
4.2 If     
 
 
  
 
 mod p     , then go to step 4. 
6. Use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to find    and s,  i.e. by solving the system of 
congruencies: 
                                . 
7.  Return s. 
 
Suppose that n =3.p. For key generation, A follows the steps below: 
Algorithm 16(Key Generation)  
1. Find a generator     of       . 
2. Find s using Algorithm 15. 
3. Compute the order of        using              . 
4. Select a random integer a,              , compute               . 
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5. A’s public key is (        )  and A’s private key is a.   
B encrypts a message m for A using the algorithm below: 
Algorithm 17 (Encryption) 
1. B obtains A’s authentic public key (         ). 
2. Represent the message as an integer in       . 
3. Select a random integer k, where              . 
4. Compute                 ,              ,                   and                           
                 . 
5. Send the ciphertext c = (   ) to A.   
To recover the plaintext m from c, A should do the following: 
Algorithm 18 (Decryption) 
1. Use the private key "a" to compute            - a. 
2. Recover the message by computing                             . 
 
Theorem 9: Suppose that       and let    be a generator of        such that 
    ,  
 
), where     is the generator of      . m       . Define   
           and                  . If         such that s   
            , 
then s = m. 
Proof:         
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But, m and s belong to the same complete residue system modulo n and s  m (mod 
n)  m = s.   
Example 5: In this example, we will work on n=3.p from case 2.  
Let p=11 so,                 
     is a generator of        ,  
     is a generator of       , s = 7.  
A uses a=3 and finds                                               
                    .  
To encrypt the message m = 5, B selects a random integer k = 2 and computes 
                 ,         
 
                           .  
Finally, A computes                                           
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Chapter Six 
ElGamal Cryptosystem over Second Group of Units of 
              
 
6.1 The Second Group of Units of               
Suppose that h(x) is an irreducible polynomial of degree n, then              
                
                        is a field whose elements are the 
polynomials in       with degree less than that of h(x).  
The order of               is  
 , its nonzero elements form a cyclic 
group                of order          
     See [3] for more details. 
[4] Contains a study of the values of n that make                  a cyclic 
group. 
Theorem 10:                  is cyclic iff one of the following conditions is 
satisfied: 
1.         where n, the degree of h(x), is prime (q is an odd prime and    ). 
2.        where, q is a Mersenne prime. 
 
6.2 Construction of                 : 
Since                 is cyclic for any value of n, and then if n satisfies Theorem 
3 both of                 and  
                would be cyclic groups.  
Hence to construct                 : 
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1. Form the group of units                . 
2. Find a generator r of                . 
3. Write                 in the form:    
                  . 
4. Find                     
                    
5. Write                       
                         
            
Example 6: Given h(x) =       . 
        
                                      . 
          
                                       and   
r = 1+ x is a generator. 
          
        1 x    1+x 
                                   
 
          
                         
                            
Table 6.2 Elements of          
        
           
                              }. 
           
                                     
 
6.3 ElGamal Cryptosystem over                  
In a previous work, ElGamal cryptosystem was employed in the setting of  
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               .  
For more details on this work see [15]. In this work we extend ElGamal scheme to the 
setting of the second group of units of                  
 
Finding the generator of                : 
Algorithm 19(Generator of                      
1. Find a generator       of                     
2. Write the order of                   as          
    
      
  . 
3. Select a random integer s,                            . 
4. For j = 1 to i, do: 
4.1 Compute      
 
   mod     . 
4.2 If        
 
 
  
 
 mod              , then go to step 3. 
5. Return    
 
At the first place in order to generate the corresponding public and private keys, entity 
A follows the steps below: 
Algorithm 20 (Key Generation) 
1. Select an irreducible polynomial h(x) of degree n. 
2. Find a generator        of                 . 
2. Find s using Algorithm 19. 
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3. Compute the order of                  using                 . 
4. Select a random integer a,                 , compute 
                 . 
5. A’s public key is (                )  and A’s private key is a.   
 
B encrypts a message m(x) for A using the algorithm below: 
Algorithm 21 (Encryption) 
1. B obtains A’s authentic public key (                ) .  
2. Choose a message m(x) from                   . 
3. Select a random integer k, where                 . 
4. Compute                    , and                 ,           
                                                 . 
5. Send the ciphertext c = (      ) to A.   
 
To recover the plaintext m from c, A should do the following: 
Algorithm 22 (Decryption) 
1. Use the private key "a" to compute               - a. 
2. Recover the message by computing                   
                        . 
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Theorem 10: Given a generator       of                  such that      
      , where        is the generator of                . Define      
                 and                              .  
If                         such that s(x)     
                  , then 
s(x) = m(x). 
Proof:            
 
                        
   
                
                              
  
                
                       
   
            
  
         
       
   
       
  
              
   
 
       
   
     
       
                   
 
                
                 
Since m(x) and s(x) are in the same complete residue system modulo h(x) and  
s     m(x) (mod h(x))  m(x) = s(x).   
Example 7: Take n=3 and choose              
        
                                       . 
          
                                      . 
           
                                    . 
A finds a generator         of             
       ,           and     
s = 5. 
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Then A selects an integer a = 4 and computes                      
Then A's public key is (                                  ).  
To encrypt the message m(x) =  , B selects a random integer k = 3 and computes 
                            
                        and, 
                                 
And sends the ciphertext (      ) to A.  
To decrypt the message A computes b = 6-4 = 2 and                      
Then computes                             
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Chapter Seven 
Testing and Evaluation 
 
7.1 Implementation of the Modified ElGamal Cryptosystem: 
 
In this section, we test and evaluate the modified cryptosystems by implementing 
modified algorithms. This is done using Mathematica 7.0 as a programming language 
and an hp computer with 1.73 GHZ CPU and 1014 MB RAM.  
 
Using Mathematica 7.0, we have written programs for the following algorithms: 
1. ElGamal with n in the form 2.  . 
2. ElGamal with n in the form 4.  . 
3. ElGamal with n in the form   . 
4. ElGamal with n in the form 3.p. 
5. ElGamal with n in the form 3.  .p. 
6. ElGamal with n in the form 2.    . 
7. ElGamal over the polynomial case. 
 
After running the programs, it was clear that all the programs have generated a public 
and private key. Then a message is encrypted and is sent to a decryption scheme 
which recovered the message. 
 
It should be noted that, working in the second group of units is more secure than that 
of the first group of units, since if the hacker found the private key he has to perform 
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complicated multiplication and power operations and sometimes he has to work with 
isomorphism functions to find the plaintext.  
Chart 7.1 and Table 7.1 show the results that were obtained after running the 
Mathematica programs for 20 times. 
 
El-Gamal Cryptosystem Evaluation 
Algorithm Key Generation Encryption Decryption 
n=3^a 972.158 5116.84 2801.47 
n=2.3^a 1941.4 10302.2 5669.9 
n=2p^a+1 2.4 2.35 7736.1 
n=4.3^a 2651.25 14160.9 2.13333 
n=3.p 2.3 6.81421*10^(-15) 6.81421*10^(-15) 
n=3.4.p 2.35 0.75 5.14996*10^(-15) 
Poly case 
937.5 20.4 3.15 
Table 7.1 ElGamal Evaluation 
 
Comparing these algorithms with each other, we conclude the following: 
 
1. All programs are reliable; they can encrypt and decrypt any message. 
 
2. For the irreducible polynomial case, it worked well but it took a considerable time 
to find an irreducible polynomial of high degree. Moreover, it takes more time to 
generate the public and private key than to decrypt or encrypt a message. Finally, it 
takes a considerable time to find some of the elements of                 when 
the degree of h(x) is high. 
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Figure 7.1 Testing results of the modified ElGamal cryptosystem 
 
3. For cases 2, 3 and 4, the time needed for encryption is more than that needed for 
generating public and private keys and for decryption. But it works well even for 
a=10000.   
 
4. Cases 5, 6 and 7 are more efficient than others since they work for every prime 
number even for primes consisting of 13 digits and they require less time for 
encryption, decryption and key generation. 
 
5. The case where n = 3p is the most efficient one since it takes the least time for 
encryption, key generation and decryption. 
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6. In case 7, the time needed for decryption was the much more than that needed for 
key generation and encryption. 
 
7.2 The Discrete Logarithm Problem: [11] 
The security of the El-Gamal cryptosystem depends on the intractability of the 
discrete logarithm problem.  
Discrete Logarithm Problem: 
Let G be a finite cyclic group of order n. Let a be a generator of G, and    . The 
Discrete Logarithm of   to the base a, denoted by      , is the unique integer x, 
       ,such that     . 
 
7.3 The baby-step Giant-Step algorithm: [11] 
To attack this cryptosystem we have to solve the discrete logarithm problem. The 
most popular attack algorithm is: 
Let       , where n is the order of a. If     , then one can write x = im + j, 
where        . Hence,   =     , which implies            . 
Algorithm 23: Baby-Step Giant-Step algorithm 
INPUT: a generator of a cyclic group G of order n, and an element      
OUTPUT: the discrete logarithm x=      . 
1. Set      . 
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2. Construct a table with entries (j,   ) for      . Sort this table by the 
second component. 
3. Compute     and set    . 
4. For i from 0 to m-1 do the following 
4.1 Check if   is the second component of some entry in the table, 
4.2 If      then return x=im+j 
4.3 Set       . 
 
7.4 Implementation of the Attack Algorithm: 
Here is a list of the implemented attack algorithms: 
1. Baby Giant with n = 2.   
2. Baby Giant with n =   . 
3. Baby Giant with n = 4.  . 
4. Baby Giant with n = 2.  +1 
5. Baby Giant with n = 3.p 
6. Baby Giant with n = 3.p.    
7. Irreducible Polynomial Baby Giant. 
 
Experimental Results: 
In order to attack any protocol that uses ElGamal public key encryption scheme we 
have to solve the discrete logarithm problem. We enhanced the Baby Step Giant Step 
algorithm to work with the modified algorithms. 
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To test the security of the algorithms, we implemented attack schemes and applied 
them on the modified algorithms.  
After running these attack algorithms, we observed the following: 
1. All the attack programs are reliable so that they can hack an encrypted 
message by finding the private key. 
 
2. In all the cases, the time needed to attack the modified cryptosystem is 
approximately the same.  
 
 
3.  The most difficult to attack is the Irreducible Polynomial case. This is due to 
the fact that mathematically it is complex and needs considerable computing 
time to find the modulus of a given polynomial with respect to a certain 
irreducible polynomial. 
 
4. We were not able to run the programs on large values of p and large powers 
since it would take a considerable time to generate some of the elements of the 
second group of units in each case. 
 
The following table shows the results of running the programs 100 times in 
each case: 
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Baby Step Giant Step Attack  Evaluation 
Algorithm Time needed in atto sec  
n=3^a 3.04119) 
n=2.3^a 3.07689 
n=2p^a+1 4.34042 
n=4.3^a 3.20547 
n=3.p 5.0357 
n=3.4.p 2.96404) 
Polynomial Case 
11.3508 
Table 7.2: Evaluation results of Baby Giant algorithm 
 
 
Chart 7.2: Baby Giant algorithm evaluation  
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion and Further Work 
 
In this chapter, a brief summary of what was done throughout this thesis is provided. 
Some suggestions for further work are also pointed out to in the other section of this 
chapter.  
We started with a simple introduction to cryptography and its keywords. Then, we 
introduced some mathematical background that clarifies some important definitions 
for keywords used throughout the chapters of the thesis.  
Then, in the literature review chapter, we concentrated on the most practical and used 
public key cryptosystems nowadays, ElGamal Cryptosystem. We described the 
classical case that was previously used and the extensions performed on this 
cryptosystems. 
Next, we introduced a new modification considering two important mathematical 
concepts:  
"The Second Group of Units of    and the Second group of Units of   
             where h(x) is an irreducible polynomial". 
 In these two chapters algorithms for Key Generation, Encryption and Decryption 
were illustrated. Examples to clarify these modifications were also provided. And 
proofs that the new modifications do really recover the plaintext from the ciphertext 
were included. 
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Testing and evaluation of the modified cryptosystems to prove their efficiency and 
security was studied in the next chapter. Computer programs are created using 
Mathematica 7.0 as a programming language. And results obtained were also included 
in that chapter. These programs were used to prove the reliability of the new 
cryptosystems. 
We did then move to attacking the Modified cryptosystem using Baby-Step-Giant-
Step algorithm. Results obtained after running this attack algorithm were presented. 
8.1 Further Work: 
For future work, we would investigate the case of n=                where a 
different algorithms would be used (since 4 and (2.  ) are not relatively prime, same 
for 4 and (4.  )).  
We can also work on the case where h(x)    or on the case where h(x) is a product 
of irreducible polynomials whose degrees are pairwise relatively prime. 
We could also work more on attacking the Modified ElGamal Cryptosystem using the 
Pohling Hellman attack algorithm. 
Finally, the RSA cryptosystem could be also extended in the setting of The second 
group of Units of                    . 
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Chapter 10
Appendices
Appendix I : U2 HZnL is cyclic while U HZnL is not
Appendix I - a : n = 3. p .2^a
GeneratorOfUAp_E :=
ModuleA8Φ, k, j, ok, t<,
p1 = 8<;
ok = 0;
Φ = EulerPhi@pD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
ForAi = 1, i £ Length@lD, i++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@iDD@@1DDl@@iDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
For@i1 = 1, i1 £ Φ, i1++,
Label@bD;
n1 = RandomInteger@82, p - 1<D;
If@GCD@n1, pD  1, k = n1, Goto@bDD; For@j = 1, j £ l1, j++,
If@PowerMod@k, Φ p1@@jDD, pD  1, ok = 1DD;
If@ok  0, t = k; Break@DD; ok = 0D; tE
GeneratorOfU2Ap_E :=
Module@8phi, l, f, l1, k, c<,
r = GeneratorOfU@pD;
c = 0;
p1 = 8<;
phi = EulerPhi@pD;
Φ = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
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f = Length@lD;
ForAj = 1, j £ f, j++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@jDD@@1DDl@@jDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
ForBk = 1, k £ Φ, k++, Label@bD;
n1 = RandomInteger@81, phi - 1<D;
If@GCD@n1, p - 1D  1, s = n1, Goto@bDD;
ForBj = 1, j £ Length@l1D, j++,
IfBPowerModBr, s
Φ
p1@@jDD
, pF  r, c = 1FF;
If@c  0, t = ChineseRemainder@82, PowerMod@r, s, pD, 3<, 83, p, 4<D;
Break@DD; c = 0F; 8s, t, r<F
CreateKeyPairsElGamalAp_E :=
Module@8s, f<,
n = 3* p*4;
Print@"Picking n= ", nD;
b = GeneratorOfU2@pD;
Θ = b@@2DD;
s = b@@1DD;
Θ1 = b@@3DD;
a = RandomInteger@81, EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD - 1<D;
Print@"Picking a = ", aD;
f = PowerMod@s, a, EulerPhi@pDD;
publicKey = 8p, Θ1, s, f<;
privateKey = a;
Print@"Public Key is ", 8p, Θ1, s, f<D;
Print@"Private Key is = ", privateKeyD; 8publicKey, privateKey<D
MessageToIntegersElGamalAm_StringE := Module@ 8l<,
l = 8<;
l = ToCharacterCode@mDD
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50   n=3.p.2^a.nb
Printed by Mathematica for Students
IntegersToMessageElGamalAintegers_ListE :=
Module@8m<,
m = FromCharacterCode@integersDD
EncryptElGamalAmessage_, publicKey_ListE :=
Module@8s, f<,
p = publicKey@@1DD;
Θ1 = publicKey@@2DD;
s = publicKey@@3DD;
f = publicKey@@4DD;
messageIntegers = MessageToIntegersElGamal@messageD;
Print@messageIntegersD;
Map@EncryptIntegerElGamal@ð, p, s, f, Θ1D &, messageIntegersDD
EncryptIntegerElGamalAmessageIntegers_, p_, s_, f_, Θ1_E :=
Module@8k<,
k = RandomInteger@81, EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD - 1<D;
c = PowerMod@s, k, EulerPhi@pDD;
Γ = PowerMod@Θ1, c, pD;
c1 = PowerMod@f, k, EulerPhi@pDD;
∆ = PowerMod@messageIntegers, c1, pD;
cipherlist = 8c, ∆<D
DecryptElGamalAcipherIntegers_List, privateKey_E :=
Module@8a<,
a = privateKey;
messageIntegers = DecryptIntegerElGamal@cipherIntegers, a, Θ1D;
Print@messageIntegersD;
IntegersToMessageElGamal@messageIntegersDD
DecryptIntegerElGamalAcipherInteger_List, a_, Θ1_E :=
ModuleA8w, e, x, y<,
e = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
b = e - a;
multA9x_, y_=E := PowerMod@y, PowerMod@x, b, EulerPhi@pDD, pD;
w = Map@mult, cipherIntegerD; wE
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Printed by Mathematica for Students
8t, 8PuKey, PriKey<< = Timing@CreateKeyPairsElGamal@10570841DD;
Print@tD;
8t, cipherText< = Timing@EncryptElGamal@" d ", PuKeyDD
Timing@DecryptElGamal@cipherText, PriKeyDD
Appendix I - b : n = 3. p
GeneratorOfUAp_E :=
ModuleA8Φ, k, j, ok, t<,
p1 = 8<;
ok = 0;
Φ = EulerPhi@pD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
ForAi = 1, i £ Length@lD, i++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@iDD@@1DDl@@iDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
For@i1 = 1, i1 £ Φ, i1++,
Label@bD;
n1 = RandomInteger@82, p - 1<D;
If@GCD@n1, pD  1, k = n1, Goto@bDD; For@j = 1, j £ l1, j++,
If@PowerMod@k, Φ p1@@jDD, pD  1, ok = 1DD;
If@ok  0, t = k; Break@DD; ok = 0D; tE
GeneratorOfU2Ap_E :=
Module@8phi, l, f, l1, k, c<,
r = GeneratorOfU@pD;
c = 0;
p1 = 8<;
phi = EulerPhi@pD;
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Φ = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
f = Length@lD;
ForAj = 1, j £ f, j++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@jDD@@1DDl@@jDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
ForBk = 1, k £ Φ, k++, Label@bD;
n1 = RandomInteger@81, phi - 1<D;
If@GCD@n1, p - 1D  1, s = n1, Goto@bDD;
ForBj = 1, j £ Length@l1D, j++,
IfBPowerModBr, s
Φ
p1@@jDD
, pF  r, c = 1FF;
If@c  0, t = ChineseRemainder@82, PowerMod@r, s, pD<, 83, p<D; Break@DD;
c = 0F; 8s, t, r<F
CreateKeyPairsElGamalAp_E :=
Module@8s, f<,
n = 3* p;
Print@"Picking n= ", nD;
b = GeneratorOfU2@pD;
Θ = b@@2DD;
s = b@@1DD;
Θ1 = b@@3DD;
a = RandomInteger@82, EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD - 1<D;
Print@"Picking a = ", aD;
f = PowerMod@s, a, EulerPhi@pDD;
publicKey = 8p, Θ1, s, f<;
privateKey = a;
Print@"Public Key is ", 8p, Θ1, s, f<D;
Print@"Private Key is = ", privateKeyD; 8publicKey, privateKey<D
MessageToIntegersElGamalAm_StringE := Module@ 8l<,
l = 8<;
l = ToCharacterCode@mDD
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EncryptElGamalAmessage_, publicKey_ListE :=
Module@8s, f<,
p = publicKey@@1DD;
Θ1 = publicKey@@2DD;
s = publicKey@@3DD;
f = publicKey@@4DD; messageIntegers = MessageToIntegersElGamal@messageD;
Print@messageIntegersD;
Map@EncryptIntegerElGamal@ð, p, s, f, Θ1D &, messageIntegersDD
EncryptIntegerElGamalAmessageIntegers_, p_, s_, f_, Θ1_E :=
Module@8k<,
k = RandomInteger@82, EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD - 1<D;
c = PowerMod@s, k, EulerPhi@pDD;
Γ = PowerMod@Θ1, c, pD;
c1 = PowerMod@f, k, EulerPhi@pDD;
∆ = PowerMod@messageIntegers, c1, pD;
cipherlist = 8c, ∆<D
DecryptElGamalAcipherIntegers_List, privateKey_E :=
Module@8a<,
a = privateKey;
messageIntegers = DecryptIntegerElGamal@cipherIntegers, a, Θ1D;
Print@messageIntegersD;
IntegersToMessageElGamal@messageIntegersDD
DecryptIntegerElGamalAcipherInteger_List, a_, Θ1_E :=
ModuleA8w, e, x, y<,
e = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
b = e - a;
multA9x_, y_=E := PowerMod@y, PowerMod@x, b, EulerPhi@pDD, pD;
w = Map@mult, cipherIntegerD; wE
8t, 8PuKey, PriKey<< = Timing@CreateKeyPairsElGamal@2760727302517DD;
Print@tD;
8t, cipherText< = Timing@EncryptElGamal@" d ", PuKeyDD
Timing@DecryptElGamal@cipherText, PriKeyDD
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Appendix I - c : n = 4.3^a
GeneratorOfUAΑ_E :=
ModuleA8Φ, k, j, ok, t<,
p = 3Α;
p1 = 8<;
ok = 0;
Φ = EulerPhi@pD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
ForAi = 1, i £ Length@lD, i++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@iDD@@1DDl@@iDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
For@i1 = 1, i1 £ Φ, i1++,
Label@bD;
n = RandomInteger@82, p - 1<D;
If@GCD@n, pD  1, k = n, Goto@bDD; For@j = 1, j £ l1, j++,
If@PowerMod@k, Φ p1@@jDD, pD  1, ok = 1DD;
If@ok  0, t = k; Break@DD; ok = 0D; tE
GeneratorOfU2AΑ_E :=
Module@8p, phi, l, f, l1, k, c<,
p = 3Α;
r = GeneratorOfU@ΑD;
Print@"r=", rD;
c = 0;
p1 = 8<;
phi = EulerPhi@pD;
Φ = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
f = Length@lD;
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ForAj = 1, j £ f, j++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@jDD@@1DDl@@jDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
ForBk = 1, k £ Φ, k++, Label@bD;
n = RandomInteger@81, phi - 1<D;
If@GCD@n, p - 1D  1, s = n, Goto@bDD;
ForBj = 1, j £ Length@l1D, j++,
IfBPowerModBr, s
Φ
p1@@jDD
, pF  r, c = 1FF;
If@c  0, t = ChineseRemainder@83, PowerMod@r, s, pD<, 84, p<D; Break@DD;
c = 0F; 8s, t, r<F
CreateKeyPairsElGamalAΑ_E :=
Module@8w, s, f<,
p = 3Α;
n = 4* p;
Print@"Picking n= ", nD;
b = GeneratorOfU2@ΑD;
Θ = b@@2DD;
s = b@@1DD;
Θ1 = b@@3DD;
a = RandomInteger@81, EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD - 1<D;
Print@"Picking a = ", aD;
f = PowerMod@s, a, EulerPhi@pDD;
publicKey = 8p, Θ1, s, f<;
privateKey = a;
Print@"Public Key is ", 8p, Θ1, s, f<D;
Print@"Private Key is = ", privateKeyD; 8publicKey, privateKey<D
MessageToIntegersElGamalAm_StringE := Module@ 8l<,
l = 8<;
l = ToCharacterCode@mDD
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IntegersToMessageElGamalAintegers_ListE :=
Module@8m<,
m = FromCharacterCode@integersDD
EncryptElGamalAmessage_, publicKey_ListE :=
Module@8s, p, f<,
p = publicKey@@1DD;
Θ1 = publicKey@@2DD;
s = publicKey@@3DD;
f = publicKey@@4DD;
messageIntegers = MessageToIntegersElGamal@messageD;
Print@messageIntegersD;
Map@EncryptIntegerElGamal@ð, p, s, f, Θ1D &, messageIntegersDD
EncryptIntegerElGamalAmessageIntegers_, p_, s_, f_, Θ1_E :=
Module@8k<,
k = RandomInteger@81, EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD - 1<D;
c = PowerMod@s, k, EulerPhi@pDD;
Γ = PowerMod@Θ1, c, pD;
c1 = PowerMod@f, k, EulerPhi@pDD;
∆ = PowerMod@messageIntegers, c1, pD;
cipherlist = 8c, ∆<D
DecryptElGamalAcipherIntegers_List, privateKey_E :=
Module@8a<,
a = privateKey;
messageIntegers = DecryptIntegerElGamal@cipherIntegers, a, Θ1D;
Print@messageIntegersD;
IntegersToMessageElGamal@messageIntegersDD
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DecryptIntegerElGamalAcipherInteger_List, a_, Θ1_E :=
ModuleA8w, e, x, y<,
e = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
b = e - a;
multA9x_, y_=E := PowerMod@y, PowerMod@x, b, EulerPhi@pDD, pD;
w = Map@mult, cipherIntegerD; wE
8t, 8PuKey, PriKey<< = Timing@CreateKeyPairsElGamal@7000DD;
Print@tD;
8t, cipherText< = Timing@EncryptElGamal@" d ", PuKeyDD
Timing@DecryptElGamal@cipherText, PriKeyDD
Appendix II : Polynomial Case
Appendix II - a : To Find Irreducible polynomials of order n in Z2
p = 2; h = 8<; hirr = 8<;
ForAb = 0, b < p, b++, ForAc = 0, c < p, c++,
ForAd = 0, d < p, d++, ForAe = 0, e < p, e++,
ForAf = 0, f < p, f++, ForAg = 0, g < p, g++, ForAn = 0, n < p, n++,
h = AppendAh, 1 + b x + c x2 + d x3 + e x4 + f x5 + g x6 + n x7EEEEEEEE;
L = Length@hD;
For@i = 1, i £ L, i++, m1 = 0;
For@j = 0, j < p, j++, If@Mod@h@@iDD . x -> j, pD  0, m1 = 1DD;
If@m1  0, hirr = Append@hirr, h@@iDDDDD;
Print@"The irreducible polynomials are: ", hirrD;
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Appendix II - b : n = 7 and p = 2
GenerateAp_, L_, H_E := ModuleA8A, i, j, k<,
A = 8<;
ForAi = 0, i £ H - 1, i++,
ForAj = 0, j £ H - 1, j++, ForAk = 0, k £ H - 1, k++, ForAl = 0, l £ H - 1, l++,
ForAm = 0, m £ H - 1, m++, ForAn = 0, n £ H - 1, n++, ForAo = 0, o £ H - 1, o++,
A = AppendAA, i + j x + k x2 + l x3 + m x4 + n x5 + o x6EEEEEEEE; AE
GeneratorAlphaAn1_E := Module@8v, v1, Α, l, q, flag, k, n, Low, ig<,
n = 2^n1 - 1;
v = FactorInteger@nD;
Α = 8<;
Α1 = 8<;
v1 = 8<;
z = 8<;
u2 = 8<;
k = 0;
ig = 0;
Label@bD;
Low = ig;
ig = Low + 2;
Α = Generate@2, Low, igD;
For@i = 2, i £ Length@ΑD,
flag = 1; l = 0;
While@flag == 1 && l <= Length@vD - 1,
l = l + 1;
q = v@@lDD@@1DD;
If@PolynomialRemainder@Α@@iDD^HnqL, 1 + x^2 + x^7, x, Modulus ® 2D == 1,
flag = 0DD; If@flag == 1, k = Α@@iDD; Break@DD; i++D;
If@flag  0, Goto@bDD; kD
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GeneratorOfU2An1_E :=
ModuleB8phi, l, f, l1, k, c<,
n = 2^n1 - 1;
r = GeneratorAlpha@n1D;
c = 0;
p1 = 8<;
l = FactorInteger@nD;
f = Length@lD;
ForAj = 1, j £ f, j++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@jDD@@1DDl@@jDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
ForBk = 1, k £ n, k++, Label@bD;
n2 = RandomInteger@81, n - 1<D;
If@GCD@n2, nD  1, s = n, Goto@bDD;
ForBj = 1, j £ Length@l1D, j++,
IfBPowerModBr, s
n
p1@@jDD
, 1 + x^2 + x^7F  r, c = 1FF;
If@c  0, t = PolynomialMod@r^s, 81 + x^2 + x^7, 2<D; Break@DD; c = 0F;
8s, t, r<F
CreateKeyPairsElGamalAn1_E :=
Module@8l, s, f, publicKey, privateKey<,
n = 2^n1 - 1;
b = GeneratorOfU2@n1D;
Print@"b = ", bD;
s = b@@1DD;
Θ1 = b@@3DD;
a = RandomInteger@81, EulerPhi@nD - 1<D;
Print@"Picking a = ", aD;
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f = PowerMod@s, a, nD;
publicKey = 8n1, Θ1, s, f<;
privateKey = a;
Print@"Public Key is ", publicKeyD;
Print@"Private Key is ", privateKeyD; 8publicKey, privateKey<D
EncryptElGamalAmessage_, publicKey_E :=
Module@8s, f<,
n1 = publicKey@@1DD;
Θ1 = publicKey@@2DD;
s = publicKey@@3DD;
f = publicKey@@4DD;
Map@EncryptIntegerElGamal@ð, n1, s, f, Θ1D &, messageDD
EncryptIntegerElGamalAmessage_, n1_, s_, f_, Θ1_E :=
Module@8k<,
n = 2^n1 - 1;
k = RandomInteger@81, EulerPhi@nD -1<D;
c = PowerMod@s, k, nD;
Γ = PolynomialMod@Θ1^c, 81 + x^2 + x^7, 2<D;
c1 = PowerMod@f, k, nD; Print@"c1 = ", c1D;
∆ = PolynomialMod@message^c1, 81 + x^2 + x^7 , 2<D; Print@"∆ = ", ∆D;
ciperlist = 8c, ∆<D
DecryptElGamalAciperIntegersList_List, privateKey_E :=
Module@8a, s, f, messageIntegers<,
a = privateKey;
messageIntegers = DecryptIntegerElGamal@ciperIntegersList, a, Θ1D;
messageIntegersD
DecryptIntegerElGamalAciperInteger_List, a_, Θ1_E :=
ModuleA8w, z, y<,
e = EulerPhi@nD;
b = e - a;
multA9z_, y_=E :=
PolynomialRemainder@HyL^PowerMod@z, b, nD, 1 + x^2 + x^7, x, Modulus ® 2D;
w = Map@mult, ciperIntegerD; wE
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8t, 8PuKey, PriKey<< = Timing@CreateKeyPairsElGamal@7DD;
Print@tD;
8t, ciperText< = Timing@EncryptElGamal@8x, x + x^2<, PuKeyDD
Timing@DecryptElGamal@ciperText, PriKeyDD
Appendix III : Both are Cyclic
Appendix III - a : n = 2.3^a
GeneratorOfUAΑ_E :=
ModuleA8Φ, k, j, ok, t<,
p = 2*3Α;
p1 = 8<;
ok = 0;
Φ = EulerPhi@pD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
ForAi = 1, i £ Length@lD, i++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@iDD@@1DDl@@iDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
For@i1 = 1, i1 £ Φ, i1++,
Label@bD;
n = RandomInteger@82, p - 1<D;
If@GCD@n, pD  1, k = n, Goto@bDD; For@j = 1, j £ l1, j++,
If@PowerMod@k, Φ p1@@jDD, pD  1, ok = 1DD;
If@ok  0, t = k; Break@DD; ok = 0D; tE
GeneratorOfU2AΑ_E :=
Module@8p, phi, l, f, l1, k, c<,
p = 2*3Α;
r = GeneratorOfU@ΑD;
c = 0;
p1 = 8<;
phi = EulerPhi@pD;
Φ = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
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l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
f = Length@lD;
ForAj = 1, j £ f, j++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@jDD@@1DDl@@jDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
ForBk = 1, k £ Φ, k++, Label@bD;
n = RandomInteger@81, phi - 1<D;
If@GCD@n, p - 1D  1, s = n, Goto@bDD;
ForBj = 1, j £ Length@l1D, j++,
IfBPowerModBr, s
Φ
p1@@jDD
, pF  r, c = 1FF;
If@c  0, t = PowerMod@r, s, pD; Break@DD; c = 0F; 8s, t, r<F
CreateKeyPairsElGamalAΑ_E :=
Module@8w, s, f<,
p = 2*3Α;
Print@"Picking n = ", pD;
b = GeneratorOfU2@ΑD;
Θ = b@@2DD;
s = b@@1DD;
Θ1 = b@@3DD;
a = RandomInteger@81, EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD - 1<D;
Print@"Picking a = ", aD;
f = PowerMod@s, a, EulerPhi@pDD;
publicKey = 8p, Θ1, s, f<;
privateKey = a;
Print@"Public Key is ", publicKeyD;
Print@"Private Key is ", privateKeyD; 8publicKey, privateKey<D
MessageToIntegersElGamalAm_StringE := Module@ 8l<,
l = 8<;
l = ToCharacterCode@mDD
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EncryptElGamalAmessage_, publicKey_E :=
Module@8s, p, f<,
p = publicKey@@1DD;
Θ1 = publicKey@@2DD;
s = publicKey@@3DD;
f = publicKey@@4DD;
messageIntegers = MessageToIntegersElGamal@messageD;
Print@messageIntegersD;
Map@EncryptIntegerElGamal@ð, p, s, f, Θ1D &, messageIntegersDD
EncryptIntegerElGamalAmessageIntegers_, p_, s_, f_, Θ1_E :=
Module@8k<,
k = RandomInteger@81, EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD - 1<D;
c = PowerMod@s, k, EulerPhi@pDD;
Γ = PowerMod@Θ1, c, pD;
c1 = PowerMod@f, k, EulerPhi@pDD;
∆ = PowerMod@messageIntegers, c1, pD;
cipherlist = 8c, ∆<D
DecryptElGamalAcipherIntegersList_List, privateKey_E :=
Module@8a<,
a = privateKey;
messageIntegers = DecryptIntegerElGamal@cipherIntegersList, a, Θ1D;
Print@messageIntegersD;
IntegersToMessageElGamal@messageIntegersDD
DecryptIntegerElGamalAcipherInteger_List, a_, Θ1_E :=
ModuleA8w, e, x, y<,
e = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
b = e - a;
multA9x_, y_=E := PowerMod@y, PowerMod@x, b, EulerPhi@pDD, pD;
w = Map@mult, cipherIntegerD; wE
8t, 8PuKey, PriKey<< = Timing@CreateKeyPairsElGamal@10001DD;
Print@tD;
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8t, cipherText< = Timing@EncryptElGamal@" d ", PuKeyDD
Timing@DecryptElGamal@cipherText, PriKeyDD
Appendix III - b : n = 2 p^a + 1
CompositeintAa1_, p_E :=
Module@8n<,
n = 2* p^a1 + 1;
nD
GeneratorOfUAa1_, q_E :=
ModuleA8Φ, k, j, ok, t<,
p = Compositeint@a1, qD;
p1 = 8<;
ok = 0;
Φ = EulerPhi@pD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
ForAi = 1, i £ Length@lD, i++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@iDD@@1DDl@@iDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
For@i1 = 1, i1 £ Φ, i1++,
Label@bD;
n = RandomInteger@82, p - 1<D;
If@GCD@n, pD  1, k = n, Goto@bDD; For@j = 1, j £ l1, j++,
If@PowerMod@k, Φ p1@@jDD, pD  1, ok = 1DD;
If@ok  0, t = k; Break@DD; ok = 0D; tE
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GeneratorOfU2Aa1_, q_E :=
ModuleB8p, phi, l, f, l1, k, c<,
p = Compositeint@a1, qD;
r = GeneratorOfU@a1, qD;
c = 0;
p1 = 8<;
phi = EulerPhi@pD;
Φ = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
f = Length@lD;
ForAj = 1, j £ f, j++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@jDD@@1DDl@@jDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
ForBk = 1, k £ Φ, k++, Label@bD;
n = RandomInteger@81, phi - 1<D;
If@GCD@n, p - 1D  1, s = n, Goto@bDD;
ForBj = 1, j £ Length@l1D, j++,
IfBPowerModBr, s
Φ
p1@@jDD
, pF  r, c = 1FF;
If@c  0, t = PowerMod@r, s, pD; Break@DD; c = 0F; 8s, t, r<F
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CreateKeyPairsElGamalAa1_, q_E :=
Module@8w, f<,
p = Compositeint@a1, qD;
Print@"Picking p = ", pD;
b = GeneratorOfU2@a1, qD;
Θ = b@@2DD;
s = b@@1DD;
Θ1 = b@@3DD;
a = RandomInteger@82, EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD - 1<D;
Print@"Picking a = ", aD;
f = PowerMod@s, a, EulerPhi@pDD;
publicKey = 8p, Θ1, s, f<;
privateKey = a;
Print@"Public Key is ", 8p, Θ1, s, f<D;
Print@"Private Key is ", privateKeyD; 8publicKey, privateKey<D
MessageToIntegersElGamalAm_StringE := Module@ 8l<,
l = 8<;
l = ToCharacterCode@mDD
IntegersToMessageElGamalAintegers_ListE :=
Module@8m<,
m = FromCharacterCode@integersDD
EncryptElGamalAmessage_, publicKey_ListE :=
Module@8s, p, f<,
p = publicKey@@1DD;
Θ1 = publicKey@@2DD;
s = publicKey@@3DD;
f = publicKey@@4DD;
messageIntegers = MessageToIntegersElGamal@messageD;
Print@messageIntegersD;
Map@EncryptIntegerElGamal@ð, p, s, f, Θ1D &, messageIntegersDD
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EncryptIntegerElGamalAmessageIntegers_, p_, s_, f_, Θ1_E :=
Module@8k<,
k = RandomInteger@81, EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD - 1<D;
c = PowerMod@s, k, EulerPhi@pDD;
Γ = PowerMod@Θ1, c, pD;
c1 = PowerMod@f, k, EulerPhi@pDD;
∆ = PowerMod@messageIntegers, c1, pD;
cipherlist = 8c, ∆<D
DecryptElGamalAcipherIntegersList_List, privateKey_E :=
Module@8a<,
a = privateKey;
messageIntegers = DecryptIntegerElGamal@cipherIntegersList, a, Θ1D;
Print@messageIntegersD;
IntegersToMessageElGamal@messageIntegersDD
DecryptIntegerElGamalAcipherInteger_List, a_, Θ1_E :=
ModuleA8w, e, x, y<,
e = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
b = e - a;
multA9x_, y_=E := PowerMod@y, PowerMod@x, b, EulerPhi@pDD, pD;
w = Map@mult, cipherIntegerD; wE
8t, 8PuKey, PriKey<< = Timing@CreateKeyPairsElGamal@1, 233DD;
Print@tD;
8t, cipherText< = Timing@EncryptElGamal@" ", PuKeyDD
Timing@DecryptElGamal@cipherText, PriKeyDD
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Appendix III - c : n = 3^a
GeneratorOfUAΑ_E :=
ModuleA8Φ, k, j, ok, t<,
p = 3Α;
p1 = 8<;
ok = 0;
Φ = EulerPhi@pD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
ForAi = 1, i £ Length@lD, i++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@iDD@@1DDl@@iDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
For@i1 = 1, i1 £ Φ, i1++,
Label@bD;
n = RandomInteger@82, p - 1<D;
If@GCD@n, pD  1, k = n, Goto@bDD; For@j = 1, j £ l1, j++,
If@PowerMod@k, Φ p1@@jDD, pD  1, ok = 1DD;
If@ok  0, t = k; Break@DD; ok = 0D; tE
GeneratorOfU2AΑ_E :=
ModuleA8p, phi, l, f, l1, k, c<,
p = 3Α;
r = GeneratorOfU@ΑD;
c = 0;
p1 = 8<;
phi = EulerPhi@pD;
Φ = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
f = Length@lD;
ForAj = 1, j £ f, j++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@jDD@@1DDl@@jDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
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ForBk = 1, k £ Φ, k++, Label@bD;
n = RandomInteger@81, phi - 1<D;
If@GCD@n, p - 1D  1, s = n, Goto@bDD;
ForBj = 1, j £ Length@l1D, j++,
IfBPowerModBr, s
Φ
p1@@jDD
, pF  r, c = 1FF;
If@c  0, t = PowerMod@r, s, pD; Break@DD; c = 0F; 8s, t, r<F
CreateKeyPairsElGamalAΑ_E :=
Module@8w, s, f<,
p = 3Α;
Print@"Picking p = ", pD;
b = GeneratorOfU2@ΑD;
Θ = b@@2DD;
s = b@@1DD;
Θ1 = b@@3DD;
a = RandomInteger@81, EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD - 1<D;
Print@"Picking a = ", aD;
f = PowerMod@s, a, EulerPhi@pDD;
publicKey = 8p, Θ1, s, f<;
privateKey = a;
Print@"Public Key is ", 8p, Θ1, s, f<D;
Print@"Private Key is ", privateKeyD; 8publicKey, privateKey<D
MessageToIntegersElGamalAm_StringE := Module@ 8l<,
l = 8<;
l = ToCharacterCode@mDD
IntegersToMessageElGamalAintegers_ListE :=
Module@8m<,
m = FromCharacterCode@integersDD
70
70   n=3.p.2^a.nb
Printed by Mathematica for Students
EncryptElGamalAmessage_, publicKey_ListE :=
Module@8s, p, f<,
p = publicKey@@1DD;
Θ1 = publicKey@@2DD;
s = publicKey@@3DD;
f = publicKey@@4DD;
messageIntegers = MessageToIntegersElGamal@messageD;
Print@messageIntegersD;
Map@EncryptIntegerElGamal@ð, p, s, f, Θ1D &,
messageIntegersD
EncryptIntegerElGamalAmessageIntegers_, p_, s_, f_, Θ1_E :=
Module@8k<,
k = RandomInteger@81, EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD - 1<D;
c = PowerMod@s, k, EulerPhi@pDD;
Γ = PowerMod@Θ1, c, pD;
c1 = PowerMod@f, k, EulerPhi@pDD;
∆ = PowerMod@messageIntegers, c1, pD;
cipherlist = 8c, ∆<D
DecryptElGamalAcipherIntegersList_List, privateKey_E :=
Module@8a<,
a = privateKey;
messageIntegers = DecryptIntegerElGamal@cipherIntegersList, a, Θ1D;
Print@messageIntegersD;
IntegersToMessageElGamal@messageIntegersDD
DecryptIntegerElGamalAcipherInteger_List, a_, Θ1_E :=
ModuleA8w, e, x, y<,
e = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
b = e - a;
multA9x_, y_=E := PowerMod@y, PowerMod@x, b, EulerPhi@pDD, pD;
w = Map@mult, cipherIntegerD; wE
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8t, 8PuKey, PriKey<< = Timing@CreateKeyPairsElGamal@5000DD;
Print@tD;
8t, cipherText< = Timing@EncryptElGamal@" d ", PuKeyDD
Timing@DecryptElGamal@cipherText, PriKeyDD
Appendix IV : Baby Giant Attack Scheme
Appendix IV - a : n = 3. p .2^a
Α = 9671;
Β = 215;
q = 1009;
a = 2;
p = 3*q *2^a;
n = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@qDD;
m = Ceiling@Sqrt@nDD;
t1 = Array@t11, 82, m<D;
MatrixForm@t1D;
Do@t1@@1, jDD = j - 1; t1@@2, jDD = PowerMod@Α, j - 1, pD, 8j, 1, m<D;
MatrixForm@t1D;
ai = PowerMod@Α, -1, pD;
am = PowerMod@ai, m, pD;
h = 1; i = 0;
e = 1;
l = 0;
While@e ¹ 0 && l £ m,
ami = PowerMod@am, i, pD;
Γ = Mod@Β*ami, pD;
Do@If@Γ == t1@@2, kDD, e = 0; j = t1@@1, kDD;
Print@"j = ", jD; t = Timing@ΓD; h = 2; Break@DD, 8k, 1, m<D; i = i + 1;D
Print@"i = ", i - 1D;
a = Hi - 1L* m + j; Print@"The Discrete Logarithm is ", aD;
Print@"Time is ", tD;
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Appendix IV - b : Elements of n = 3. p .2^a
GeneratorOfUAp_E :=
ModuleA8Φ, k, j, ok, t<,
p1 = 8<;
ok = 0;
Φ = EulerPhi@pD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
ForAi = 1, i £ Length@lD, i++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@iDD@@1DDl@@iDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
For@i1 = 1, i1 £ Φ, i1++,
Label@bD;
n1 = RandomInteger@82, p - 1<D;
If@GCD@n1, pD  1, k = n1
, Goto@bDD; For@j = 1, j £ l1, j++,
If@PowerMod@k, Φ p1@@jDD, pD  1, ok = 1DD;
If@ok  0, t = k; Break@DD; ok = 0D; tE
ElmOfU2Ap_E :=
Module@8un, s<,
n = 3* p*4;
m = 8<;
un = 8<;
s = 8<;
r = GeneratorOfU@pD; Print@rD;
For@i = 1, i £ n, i++, If@GCD@i, nD  1, un = Append@un, iDDD;
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For@i = 1, i £ Length@unD, i++,
s = Append@s, 8Mod@un@@iDD, 3D, Mod@un@@iDD, pD, Mod@un@@iDD, 4D<DD;
For@k = 2, k £ 200, k++,
For@j = 0, j < EulerPhi@pD, j++,
If@Mod@r^j, pD  s@@kDD@@2DD,
If@GCD@j, p - 1D  1,
If@s@@kDD@@1DD  2, If@s@@kDD@@3DD  3, m = Append@m, un@@kDDDDDDDDD; mD
GeneratorOfU2Ap_E :=
ModuleB8phi, l, f, l1, k, c<,
r = 563;
c = 0;
p1 = 8<;
phi = EulerPhi@pD;
Φ = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
f = Length@lD;
ForAj = 1, j £ f, j++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@jDD@@1DDl@@jDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
ForBk = 1, k £ Φ, k++, Label@bD;
n1 = RandomInteger@81, phi - 1<D;
If@GCD@n1, p - 1D  1, s = n1, Goto@bDD;
ForBj = 1, j £ Length@l1D, j++,
IfBPowerModBr, s
Φ
p1@@jDD
, pF  r, c = 1FF;
If@c  0, t = ChineseRemainder@82, PowerMod@r, s, pD, 3<, 83, p, 4<D;
Break@DD; c = 0F; tF
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Appendix IV - c : n = 3. p
Α = 1550;
Β = 107;
q = 1009;
p = 3*q;
n = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@qDD;
m = Ceiling@Sqrt@nDD;
t1 = Array@t11, 82, m<D;
MatrixForm@t1D;
Do@t1@@1, jDD = j - 1; t1@@2, jDD = PowerMod@Α, j - 1, pD, 8j, 1, m<D;
MatrixForm@t1D;
ai = PowerMod@Α, -1, pD;
am = PowerMod@ai, m, pD;
h = 1; i = 0;
e = 1;
l = 0;
While@e ¹ 0 && l £ m,
ami = PowerMod@am, i, pD;
Γ = Mod@Β*ami, pD;
Do@If@Γ == t1@@2, kDD, e = 0; j = t1@@1, kDD;
Print@"j = ", jD; t = Timing@ΓD; h = 2; Break@DD, 8k, 1, m<D; i = i + 1;D
Print@"i = ", i - 1D;
a = Hi - 1L* m + j; Print@"The Discrete Logarithm is ", aD;
Print@"Time is ", tD;
75
Printed by Mathematica for Students
Appendix IV - d : Elements of n = 3. p
GeneratorOfUAp_E :=
ModuleA8Φ, k, j, ok, t<,
p1 = 8<;
ok = 0;
Φ = EulerPhi@pD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
ForAi = 1, i £ Length@lD, i++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@iDD@@1DDl@@iDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
For@i1 = 1, i1 £ Φ, i1++,
Label@bD;
n1 = RandomInteger@82, p - 1<D;
If@GCD@n1, pD  1, k = n1
, Goto@bDD; For@j = 1, j £ l1, j++,
If@PowerMod@k, Φ p1@@jDD, pD  1, ok = 1DD;
If@ok  0, t = k; Break@DD; ok = 0D; tE
ElmOfU2Ap_E :=
Module@8un, s<,
n = 3* p;
m = 8<;
un = 8<;
s = 8<;
r = GeneratorOfU@pD; Print@rD;
For@i = 1, i £ 200, i++, If@GCD@i, nD  1, un = Append@un, iDDD;
For@i = 1, i £ Length@unD, i++,
s = Append@s, 8Mod@un@@iDD, 3D, Mod@un@@iDD, pD<DD;
For@k = 2, k £ 50, k++,
For@j = 0, j < EulerPhi@pD, j++,
If@Mod@r^j, pD  s@@kDD@@2DD,
If@GCD@j, p - 1D  1, If@s@@kDD@@1DD  2, m = Append@m, un@@kDDDDDDDD; mD
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GeneratorOfU2Ap_E :=
ModuleB8phi, l, f, l1, k, c<,
r = 3512;
n = 3* p;
c = 0;
u = 8<;
p1 = 8<;
m = 8<;
phi = EulerPhi@pD;
Φ = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
f = Length@lD;
ForAj = 1, j £ f, j++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@jDD@@1DDl@@jDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
ForBk = 1, k £ Φ, k++, Label@bD;
n1 = RandomInteger@81, phi - 1<D;
If@GCD@n1, p - 1D  1, s = n1, Goto@bDD;
ForBj = 1, j £ Length@l1D, j++,
IfBPowerModBr, s
Φ
p1@@jDD
, pF  r, c = 1FF;
If@c  0,
t = ChineseRemainder@82, PowerMod@r, s, pD<, 83, p<D; Break@DD; c = 0F; tF
n1 = GeneratorOfU2@1481D; Print@n1D;
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Appendix IV - e : n = 4.3^a
Α = 119;
Β = 143;
a = 5;
q = 3^a;
p = 4*q;
n = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@qDD;
m = Ceiling@Sqrt@nDD;
t1 = Array@t11, 82, m<D;
MatrixForm@t1D;
Do@t1@@1, jDD = j - 1; t1@@2, jDD = PowerMod@Α, j - 1, pD, 8j, 1, m<D;
MatrixForm@t1D;
ai = PowerMod@Α, -1, pD;
am = PowerMod@ai, m, pD;
h = 1; i = 0;
e = 1;
l = 0;
While@e ¹ 0 && l £ m,
ami = PowerMod@am, i, pD;
Γ = Mod@Β*ami, pD;
Do@If@Γ == t1@@2, kDD, e = 0; j = t1@@1, kDD;
Print@"j = ", jD; t = Timing@ΓD; h = 2; Break@DD, 8k, 1, m<D; i = i + 1;D
Print@"i = ", i - 1D;
a = Hi - 1L* m + j; Print@"The Discrete Logarithm is ", aD;
Print@"Time is ", tD;
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Appendix IV - f : Elements of n = 4.3^a
GeneratorOfUAa_E :=
ModuleA8Φ, k, j, ok, t<,
p = 3^a;
p1 = 8<;
ok = 0;
Φ = EulerPhi@pD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
ForAi = 1, i £ Length@lD, i++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@iDD@@1DDl@@iDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
For@i1 = 1, i1 £ Φ, i1++,
Label@bD;
n1 = RandomInteger@82, p - 1<D;
If@GCD@n1, pD  1, k = n1
, Goto@bDD; For@j = 1, j £ l1, j++,
If@PowerMod@k, Φ p1@@jDD, pD  1, ok = 1DD;
If@ok  0, t = k; Break@DD; ok = 0D; tE
ElmOfU2Aa_E :=
Module@8un, s<,
p = 3^a;
n = 4* p;
m = 8<;
un = 8<;
s = 8<;
r = GeneratorOfU@aD; Print@rD;
For@i = 1, i £ n, i++, If@GCD@i, nD  1, un = Append@un, iDDD;
For@i = 1, i £ 200, i++, s = Append@s, 8Mod@un@@iDD, 4D, Mod@un@@iDD, pD<DD;
For@k = 2, k £ 50, k++,
For@j = 0, j < EulerPhi@pD, j++,
If@Mod@r^j, pD  s@@kDD@@2DD,
If@GCD@j, p - 1D  1, If@s@@kDD@@1DD  3, m = Append@m, un@@kDDDDDDDD; mD
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GeneratorOfU2Aa_E :=
ModuleB8phi, l, f, l1, k, c<,
r = 95;
p = 3^a;
n = 4* p;
c = 0;
u = 8<;
p1 = 8<;
m = 8<;
phi = EulerPhi@pD;
Φ = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
f = Length@lD;
ForAj = 1, j £ f, j++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@jDD@@1DDl@@jDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
ForBk = 1, k £ Φ, k++, Label@bD;
n1 = RandomInteger@81, phi - 1<D;
If@GCD@n1, p - 1D  1, s = n1, Goto@bDD;
ForBj = 1, j £ Length@l1D, j++,
IfBPowerModBr, s
Φ
p1@@jDD
, pF  r, c = 1FF;
If@c  0,
t = ChineseRemainder@83, PowerMod@r, s, pD<, 84, p<D; Break@DD; c = 0F; tF
n1 = GeneratorOfU2@5D; Print@n1D;
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Appendix IV - g : n = 2.3^a
Α = 1037;
Β = 923;
a = 6;
q = 2*3^a;
n = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@qDD;
m = Ceiling@Sqrt@nDD;
t1 = Array@t11, 82, m<D;
MatrixForm@t1D;
Do@t1@@1, jDD = j - 1; t1@@2, jDD = PowerMod@Α, j - 1, qD, 8j, 1, m<D;
MatrixForm@t1D;
ai = PowerMod@Α, -1, qD;
am = PowerMod@ai, m, qD;
h = 1; i = 0;
e = 1;
l = 0;
While@e ¹ 0 && l £ m,
ami = PowerMod@am, i, qD;
Γ = Mod@Β*ami, qD;
Do@If@Γ == t1@@2, kDD, e = 0; j = t1@@1, kDD;
Print@"j = ", jD; t = Timing@ΓD; h = 2; Break@DD, 8k, 1, m<D; i = i + 1;D
Print@"i = ", i - 1D;
a = Hi - 1L* m + j; Print@"The Discrete Logarithm is ", aD;
Print@"Time is ", tD;
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Appendix IV - h : Elements of n = 2.3^a
GeneratorOfUAΑ_E :=
ModuleA8Φ, k, j, ok, t<,
p = 2*3Α;
p1 = 8<;
ok = 0;
Φ = EulerPhi@pD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
ForAi = 1, i £ Length@lD, i++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@iDD@@1DDl@@iDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
For@i1 = 1, i1 £ Φ, i1++,
Label@bD;
n = RandomInteger@82, p - 1<D;
If@GCD@n, pD  1, k = n, Goto@bDD; For@j = 1, j £ l1, j++,
If@PowerMod@k, Φ p1@@jDD, pD  1, ok = 1DD;
If@ok  0, t = k; Break@DD; ok = 0D; tE
ElmOfU2Aa_E :=
Module@8un, s<,
m = 8<;
un = 8<;
r = GeneratorOfU@aD; Print@rD;
For@i = 1, i < 2*3^a, i++, If@GCD@i, 2*3^aD  1, un = Append@un, iDDD;
For@k = 2, k £ EulerPhi@2*3^aD, k++,
For@j = 0, j < EulerPhi@2*3^aD, j++,
If@Mod@r^j, 2*3^aD  un@@kDD,
If@GCD@j, EulerPhi@2*3^aDD  1, m = Append@m, un@@kDDDDDDD; mD
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GeneratorOfU2AΑ_E :=
ModuleB8p, phi, l, f, l1, k, c<,
p = 2*3Α;
r = 299;
c = 0;
p1 = 8<;
phi = EulerPhi@pD;
Φ = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
f = Length@lD;
ForAj = 1, j £ f, j++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@jDD@@1DDl@@jDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
ForBk = 1, k £ Φ, k++, Label@bD;
n = RandomInteger@81, phi - 1<D;
If@GCD@n, p - 1D  1, s = n, Goto@bDD;
ForBj = 1, j £ Length@l1D, j++,
IfBPowerModBr, s
Φ
p1@@jDD
, pF  r, c = 1FF;
If@c  0, t = PowerMod@r, s, pD; Break@DD; c = 0F; tF
n1 = GeneratorOfU2@6D; Print@n1D;
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Appendix IV - i : n = 2 p^a + 1
Α = 304;
Β = 408;
a = 1;
q = 233;
p = 2*q^a + 1;
n = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
m = Ceiling@Sqrt@nDD;
t1 = Array@t11, 82, m<D;
MatrixForm@t1D;
Do@t1@@1, jDD = j - 1; t1@@2, jDD = PowerMod@Α, j - 1, pD, 8j, 1, m<D;
MatrixForm@t1D;
ai = PowerMod@Α, -1, pD;
am = PowerMod@ai, m, pD;
h = 1; i = 0;
e = 1;
l = 0;
While@e ¹ 0 && l £ m,
ami = PowerMod@am, i, pD;
Γ = Mod@Β*ami, pD;
Do@If@Γ == t1@@2, kDD, e = 0; j = t1@@1, kDD;
Print@"j = ", jD; t = Timing@ΓD; h = 2; Break@DD, 8k, 1, m<D; i = i + 1D;
Print@"i = ", i - 1D;
a = Hi - 1L* m + j; Print@"The Discrete Logarithm is ", aD;
Print@"Time is ", tD;
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Appendix IV - j : Elements of n = 2 p^a + 1
GeneratorOfUAΑ_, q_E :=
ModuleA8Φ, k, j, ok, t<,
p = 2*qΑ + 1;
p1 = 8<;
ok = 0;
Φ = EulerPhi@pD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
ForAi = 1, i £ Length@lD, i++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@iDD@@1DDl@@iDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
For@i1 = 1, i1 £ Φ, i1++,
Label@bD;
n = RandomInteger@82, p - 1<D;
If@GCD@n, pD  1, k = n, Goto@bDD; For@j = 1, j £ l1, j++,
If@PowerMod@k, Φ p1@@jDD, pD  1, ok = 1DD;
If@ok  0, t = k; Break@DD; ok = 0D; tE
ElmOfU2Aa_, q_E :=
Module@8un, s<,
m = 8<;
un = 8<;
r = GeneratorOfU@a, qD; Print@rD;
For@i = 1, i < 2*q^a + 1, i++, If@GCD@i, 2*q^a + 1D  1, un = Append@un, iDDD;
For@k = 2, k £ EulerPhi@2*q^a + 1D, k++,
For@j = 0, j < EulerPhi@2*q^a + 1D, j++,
If@Mod@r^j, 2*q^a + 1D  un@@kDD,
If@GCD@j, EulerPhi@2*q^a + 1DD  1, m = Append@m, un@@kDDDDDDD; mD
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GeneratorOfU2AΑ_, q_E :=
ModuleB8p, phi, l, f, l1, k, c<,
p = 2*qΑ + 1;
r = 428;
c = 0;
p1 = 8<;
phi = EulerPhi@pD;
Φ = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
f = Length@lD;
ForAj = 1, j £ f, j++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@jDD@@1DDl@@jDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
ForBk = 1, k £ Φ, k++, Label@bD;
n = RandomInteger@81, phi - 1<D;
If@GCD@n, p - 1D  1, s = n, Goto@bDD;
ForBj = 1, j £ Length@l1D, j++,
IfBPowerModBr, s
Φ
p1@@jDD
, pF  r, c = 1FF;
If@c  0, t = PowerMod@r, s, pD; Break@DD; c = 0F; tF
n1 = GeneratorOfU2@1, 233D; Print@n1D;
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Appendix IV - k : n = 3^a
Α = 2;
Β = 29;
a = 4;
q = 3^a;
n = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@qDD;
m = Ceiling@Sqrt@nDD;
t1 = Array@t11, 82, m<D;
MatrixForm@t1D;
Do@t1@@1, jDD = j - 1; t1@@2, jDD = PowerMod@Α, j - 1, qD, 8j, 1, m<D;
d = MatrixForm@t1D;
ai = PowerMod@Α, -1, qD;
am = PowerMod@ai, m, qD;
h = 1; i = 0;
e = 1;
l = 0;
While@e ¹ 0 && l £ m,
ami = PowerMod@am, i, qD;
Γ = Mod@Β*ami, qD;
Do@If@Γ == t1@@2, kDD, e = 0; j = t1@@1, kDD;
Print@"j = ", jD; t = Timing@ΓD; h = 2; Break@DD, 8k, 1, m<D; i = i + 1D;
Print@"i = ", i - 1D;
a = Hi - 1L* m + j; Print@"The Discrete Logarithm is ", aD;
Print@"Time is ", tD;
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Appendix IV - l : Elements of n = 3^a
GeneratorOfUAΑ_E :=
ModuleA8Φ, k, j, ok, t<,
p = 3Α;
p1 = 8<;
ok = 0;
Φ = EulerPhi@pD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
ForAi = 1, i £ Length@lD, i++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@iDD@@1DDl@@iDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
For@i1 = 1, i1 £ Φ, i1++,
Label@bD;
n = RandomInteger@82, p - 1<D;
If@GCD@n, pD  1, k = n, Goto@bDD; For@j = 1, j £ l1, j++,
If@PowerMod@k, Φ p1@@jDD, pD  1, ok = 1DD;
If@ok  0, t = k; Break@DD; ok = 0D; tE
ElmOfU2Aa_E :=
Module@8un, s<,
m = 8<;
un = 8<;
r = GeneratorOfU@aD; Print@rD;
For@i = 1, i < 3^a, i++, If@GCD@i, 3^aD  1, un = Append@un, iDDD; Print@unD;
For@k = 2, k £ EulerPhi@3^aD, k++,
For@j = 0, j < EulerPhi@3^aD, j++,
If@Mod@r^j, 3^aD  un@@kDD,
If@GCD@j, EulerPhi@3^aDD  1, m = Append@m, un@@kDDD; Print@mDDDDD; mD
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GeneratorOfU2AΑ_E :=
ModuleB8p, phi, l, f, l1, k, c<,
p = 3Α;
r = GeneratorOfU@ΑD;
c = 0;
p1 = 8<;
phi = EulerPhi@pD;
Φ = EulerPhi@EulerPhi@pDD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
f = Length@lD;
ForAj = 1, j £ f, j++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@jDD@@1DDl@@jDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
ForBk = 1, k £ Φ, k++, Label@bD;
n = RandomInteger@81, phi - 1<D;
If@GCD@n, p - 1D  1, s = n, Goto@bDD;
ForBj = 1, j £ Length@l1D, j++,
IfBPowerModBr, s
Φ
p1@@jDD
, pF  r, c = 1FF;
If@c  0, t = PowerMod@r, s, pD; Break@DD; c = 0F; tF
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Appendix IV - m : Polynomial case
p = 2;
Α = x^5 + x^4;
Β = x^6;
g = 1 + x^2 + x^7;
n = p7 - 1;
m = Ceiling@Sqrt@nDD;
t1 = Array@t11, 82, m<D;
MatrixForm@t1D;
DoAt1@@1, jDD = j - 1; t1@@2, jDD = PolynomialModAΑj-1, 8g, p<E
, 8j, 1, m<E;
MatrixForm@t1D;
polygcdAf_, g_, p_E := H
r1 = f; r2 = g;
d1 = 0; s1 = 1;
d2 = 1; s2 = 0;
While@Exponent@r2, xD != 0,
q = PolynomialMod@PolynomialQuotient@r1, r2, xD, pD;
r = PolynomialMod@PolynomialRemainder@r1, r2, xD, pD;
d = PolynomialMod@-q *d2 + d1, pD;
s = PolynomialMod@-q *s2 + s1, pD;
r1 = r2; r2 = r;
d1 = d2; d2 = d;
s1 = s2; s2 = s;D;
t := PolynomialMod@PolynomialGCD@r1, r2, xD, pD; sr2 L
ai = polygcd@Α, g, pD;
am = PolynomialMod@aim, 8g, p<D;
h = 1; i = 0;
e = 1;
l = 0;
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WhileAe ¹ 0 && l £ m,
Γ = PolynomialModAΒ*ami, 8g, p<E;
Do@If@Γ == t1@@2, kDD, e = 0; j = t1@@1, kDD; Print@"j = ", jD;
t = Timing@ΓD; h = 2; Break@DD, 8k, 1, m<D; i = i + 1; l++E
Print@"i = ", i - 1D; a = Hi - 1L* m + j; Print@"The Discrete Log is ", aD;
Print@"Time is ", tD;
Appendix IV - n : Elements of Polynomial Case
GenerateAH_E := ModuleA8A, i, j, k<,
A = 8<;
ForAi = 0, i £ H - 1, i++,
ForAj = 0, j £ H - 1, j++, ForAk = 0, k £ H - 1, k++, ForAl = 0, l £ H - 1, l++,
ForAm = 0, m £ H - 1, m++, ForAn = 0, n £ H - 1, n++, ForAo = 0, o £ H - 1, o++,
A = AppendAA, i + j x + k x2 + l x3 + m x4 + n x5 + o x6EEEEEEEE; AE
GeneratorAlphaAn1_E := Module@8v, v1, Α, l, q, flag, k, n, Low, ig<,
n = 2^n1 - 1;
v = FactorInteger@nD;
Α = 8<;
Α1 = 8<;
v1 = 8<;
z = 8<;
u2 = 8<;
k = 0;
ig = 0;
Label@bD;
Α = Generate@2D;
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For@i = 2, i £ Length@ΑD,
flag = 1; l = 0;
While@flag == 1 && l <= Length@vD - 1,
l = l + 1;
q = v@@lDD@@1DD;
If@PolynomialRemainder@Α@@iDD^HnqL, 1 + x^7 + x^2, x, Modulus ® 2D == 1,
flag = 0DD; If@flag == 1, k = Α@@iDD; Break@DD; i++D;
If@flag  0, Goto@bDD; kD
GeneratorOfU2Anm_E :=
ModuleA8n, p, phi, l, f, l1, k, c<,
n = 2^nm - 1;
r = GeneratorAlpha@nmD;
Print@"r = ", rD;
c = 0;
t = 8<;
p1 = 8<;
Φ = EulerPhi@nD;
l = FactorInteger@ΦD;
f = Length@lD;
ForAj = 1, j £ f, j++, p1 = AppendAp1, l@@jDD@@1DDl@@jDD@@2DDEE;
l1 = Length@p1D;
For@k = 1, k £ 10, k++, Label@bD;
n2 = RandomInteger@81, n - 1<D;
If@GCD@n2, nD  1, s = n2, Goto@bDD;
t = Append@t, PolynomialMod@r^s, 81 + x^2 + x^7, 2<DDD;
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ForBk = 1, k £ n, k++, Label@bD;
n2 = RandomInteger@81, n - 1<D;
If@GCD@n2, nD  1, s = n2, Goto@bDD;
ForBj = 1, j £ l1, j++,
IfBPowerModBr, s
n
p1@@jDD
, 91 + x^7 + x2, 2=F  r, c = 1FF;
If@c  0,
t1 = PolynomialMod@r^s, 81 + x^2 + x^7, 2<D; Print@sD; Break@DD; c = 0F;
8t, t1<F
93
Printed by Mathematica for Students
